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Abstract. As a country that lies in the area known as the Ring of Fire, Indonesia is prone 
to many disasters and the aftermaths of such crises, from low-scale earthquake events up 
to mega-magnitude tsunami, earthquakes and volcanoes. The current Covid-19 pandemic 
is another disaster in mega magnitude scale that the country must deal with. Research on 
disaster risk reduction and management has been conducted, yet little is known about 
how governments, as the most important actor in disaster countermeasures, develop their 
institutions based on unpredictable exogenous factors.  This study aims to critically analyse 
disaster and crisis countermeasures in Indonesia based on a constructivist perspective. The 
data for this qualitative study were mainly collected through document studies, together 
with some interviews. The mega-crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in the 
establishment of long-term national, provincial, local, and lower-level task forces all over 
Indonesia.  This kind of institutional arrangement has never previously been developed in 
the country, not even after the 2006 mega-tsunami which hit various provinces and led to a 
huge death toll of over 100,000. The study shows that although the institutional arrangements 
for disaster countermeasures in Indonesia are based on the same law, the implementation of 
institutional structures and practices as disaster countermeasures vary greatly.  
Keywords: disaster management, crisis countermeasures, constructivist institutionalism 
perspective, Indonesia.
1. Introduction
As a nation that sits on the Ring of 
Fire, Indonesia faces many crisis and 
disasters all over the country of varying 
magnitudes, from small-scale ones such 
as local floods, up to the mega- magnitude 
tsunami which killed more than 100,000 
Acehnese and North Sumatrans at the 
end of 2004. According to a report in a 
prominent national newspaper, Kompas, 
from January to April 2019 Indonesia 
suffered from 1538 disasters, resulting 
in 325 deaths, 113 missing, 1439 injured, 
and 996,143 temporary refugees (Kompas, 
2019). According to the news, 3588 houses 
were seriously damaged, 3289 moderately 
damaged, and 15,376 slightly damaged. 
Up to December 2019, the total number of 
disasters was 3768, with 478 deaths, 109 
missing, 3419 injured, 6.1 million temporary 
refugees, and 73,427 damaged houses (Voice 
of Indonesia, 2019).  Most of the disasters 
(3,731, or 99%) were hydrometeorologic ones 
and 1% geological.  In addition, based on an 
official report by BNPB (National Boards 
for Disaster Countermeasures) (BNPB, 
2020), from early 2020 up to 18 May 2020 
there had been 1296 disasters in Indonesia, 
which were dominated by flash floods, 
thunderstorms, volcano eruptions, and 
landslides (See Figure 1).  These consisted of 
five earthquakes, three mountain eruptions, 
120 forest fires, one fire, 495 floods, 291 
landslides, 375 thunderstorms, five tidal 
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waves, and one pandemic.  As the result of 
the disasters (excluding Covid victims), there 
were 178 deaths, eight people missing, 249 
injured, and 2,015,363 considered as temporary 
domestic refugees. In terms of property 
damage, 17,563 houses were damaged (3891 
severely, 2551 moderately, and 11,121 slightly); 
and 759 public facilities were damaged (331 
education facilities, 369 commercial facilities, 
and 32 health facilities).  In the same period, 
Covid-19 led to 17,514 positive cases and 1148 
deaths, while based on the latest BNPB report 
(BNPB, 2020), there were 123,503 positive 
Covid cases and 5658 deaths.
As a country highly prone to disasters, 
Indonesia needs strong institutional 
arrangements to deal with them.  The most 
important actor in conducting disaster 
countermeasures is the government, in this 
case the Government of Indonesia (GoI). 
Although government always works with other 
stakeholders (domestically and internationally) 
to counter disasters, success or failure will 
greatly depend on government policies both 
in its anticipation and response.  In a previous 
paper (Darmastuti and Rosalia, 2019), we 
presented the argument that although the 
government has developed a multi stakeholder 
partnership (MSP) with local community-
based organizations (CBO), non-government 
organizations (NGO), professional groups and 
other groups, its failure to develop a network 
partnership (a strong institutional partnership 
between government institutions and other 
disaster stakeholders) has created a critical 
situation in countering tsunami.  Therefore, 
it is important to study in more detail how 
the government could develop institutional 
arrangements to counter disasters in a better 
fashion.  
Figure 1. Distribution of disasters in Indonesia (BNPB, 2020)
2. Crisis and disaster institutional 
arrangements: literature and theoretical 
perspectives
A review of previous research on 
institutional arrangements for disaster 
countermeasures showed that governments, 
including local ones, are important actors in 
disaster risk reduction (Malalgoda, Amaratunga 
and Pathirage, 2010).  It was claimed that local 
governments, being the first responder and 
responsible for community development, 
plays a significant role in conducting disaster 
risk reduction (DRR) initiatives.  However, 
shortages in financial, manpower and resource 
availability may prevent them from making 
timely decisions and responses to disasters. 
Therefore, local governments need to improve 
their institutional structures and performance. 
Jones et al., (2014) present similar point of view 
in relation to the importance of the government 
role in DRR in Nepal, stating that although 
national government may not be genuinely 
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working in taking DRR initiatives due self-
interest, genuine DRR from national and 
international non-government organizations 
(NGOs), multilateral agencies and donors can 
lead to considerable progress in such initiatives. 
They claim that in post-conflict and weak states, 
support from NGOs and international agencies 
and donors are key elements in ensuring that 
DRR initiatives work efficiently. 
In time-series cross-sectional data research, 
Persson and Povitkina (2017) linked disaster 
countermeasures with the performance of 
democracy. They argue that democracy may 
lead to fewer disaster-affected people only when 
there is good institutional quality.  Otherwise, 
people may suffer more in democracies than 
in authoritarian states.  Goyal (2019) analyzed 
disasters in India and showed that inadequate 
preparedness and disaster mitigation may push 
back development by decades.  The inability 
of states to translate scientific warnings of 
disasters into first line responders and to the 
community leads to greater risks in affected 
communities.  The study highlighted the 
importance of intitutional decentralization, as 
well as more active community participation, 
in order to create a better and anticipative 
framework for DRR in order to change the 
previous post-disaster releief and rehabilitation 
approach.  
However, Walch (2017) highlighted 
adaptive governance as the most crucial 
arrangement, since it enables governments 
to embrace disaster uncertainty by enlarging 
the potential for collaboration, flexibility, 
and learning.  The study shows that adaptive 
governance in DRR remains underdeveloped 
and understudied.  In addition, it will only 
succeed under two conditions: government’s 
ability to turn the aftermath of the shock of 
disasters into serious rethinking, and its ability 
to reform previous governance practices into a 
more resilient system.
Indonesia is an archipelago which 
experiences disasters on all scales, from small 
insignificant ones, up to highly disastrous ones. 
Many studies have been conducted related to 
DRR management.  However, serious research 
with critical analysis based on the constructivist 
intitutional perspective which seeks a clear 
picture of how govenment institutions reform 
previous governance practices into a more 
resilient system to countermeasure disasters 
and crisis has yet to be conducted, especially 
in the Indonesian context.  This study therefore 
aims to fill this knowledge gap. 
Furthermore, in the context of theoretical 
discussion of the subject of institutional 
arrangements for crisis and disasters, it is 
necessary to take into account the critical point 
of view as to how problems related to state 
and state capacity may influence the capability 
of governments to overcome crisis and 
disasters (Glassbergen, 2009). This includes 
(1) the erosion of state capacity; (2) democratic 
shortcomings (problems with representation 
and accountability); and (3) arguments related 
to fragmentation (of ideas, interests, priorities, 
etc). Glassbergen states further that the problem 
of erosion of state capacity is compensated 
by the financial capacity of business sectors 
and other motives they may have, such as 
gaining social recognition through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Glassbergen states 
further that problems with representation and 
accountability make the roles of the private 
sector and civil society in global politics and 
policy more salient; policies developed outside 
formal state channels are no less important than 
formal state-driven ones. Meanwhile he says 
problem of fragmentation (of formal norms 
and regulations) may stimulate innovation 
based the norms, regulations, theories, and 
stories from business and civil society. Further, 
Glassbergen argues that these three problems 
of state capability may be compensated for 
by working together with other disaster 
stakeholders through an institutional 
arrangement called meta-governance or 
governance of governances. 
It is important to note that although 
government institutions are the most important 
actors in the counter-measuring of disasters, 
government may have shortcomings due to the 
complexity of crisis and disaster management; 
may face financial difficulties or even financial 
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crisis; have limited human resources; and suffer 
from inflexibility in the hierarchical authorities 
linking the state with local-level micro-practices 
of social innovation and self-government 
(Amore and Hall, 2015; Boin, Ekengren, and 
Rhinard, 2006). In addition, it may be incapable 
of linking private and local governance 
(Beisheim et al., 2017; Bell and Park, 2006).  In a 
previous study, Darmastuti and Rosalia (2019) 
argued that government may choose one type 
of institutional arrangement to link it with 
other disaster and crisis stakeholders, namely a 
multi-stakeholder or network partnership.  The 
study revealed that the aftermath of the tsunami 
in Lampung Province in Indonesia at the end of 
2018 was managed through multi-stakeholder 
partnership (MSP) meta-governance, in 
which many institutions worked together by 
using their own respective rules, resources, 
and capabilities to join other stakeholders in 
countering the effects of the tsunami disaster. 
It should be taken into consideration that 
this research primarily focuses on how state- 
constructed rules, institutions and practices 
(at the national, regional and local levels) can 
be used as countermeasures for disasters and 
crises, including the latest mega disaster and 
the crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic.  It focuses 
on more detailed questions such as how rights 
and responsibilities are shared and put into 
action in the wake of disasters and crises.  The 
following section will describe the theoretical 
perspective on institutional arrangements 
based on new institutional approach, namely 
constructivist institutionalism. According to 
March and Olsen (2006: 4)  the term ‘institution’ 
means:
“A relatively enduring collection of rules 
and organized practices, embedded in structures 
of meaning and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and 
relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences 
and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances (March and Olsen 1989, 
1995). There are constitutive rules and practices 
prescribing appropriate behaviour for specific 
actors in specific situations. There are structures 
of meaning, embedded in identities and belongings: 
common purposes and accounts that give direction 
and meaning to behaviour, and explain, justify, 
and legitimate behavioural codes. There are 
structures of resources that create capabilities 
for acting. Institutions empower and constrain 
actors differently and make them more or less 
capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of 
appropriateness. Institutions are also reinforced 
by third parties in enforcing rules and sanctioning 
non-compliance”.
Some key features of the concept of 
institutions are rules, organized practices, 
structures, preferences, expectations, 
individuals and external circumstances. The 
concept also conveys other aspects such as 
structured meanings, identities, common 
purposes and accounts that justify and 
legitimate behavioral codes.  It also covers 
prescriptive rules of appropriateness which 
are always reinforced by third party rules and 
used as a tool for sanctioning non-compliance. 
Institutions can also be studied based on 
several theories; for example, “old/normative, 
historical, rational choice, constructivist, 
and network institutionalism” (Rhodes et 
al., 2006: 23-111).   In short, old/normative 
institutionalism studies institutions through 
an analysis of how values are manifested in its 
rules and respective structures. On the other 
hand, historical institutionalism considers 
institutions through their changes over time 
in adjusting to changes in the environment, 
while rational choice institutionalism examines 
the “best means to achieve the best results” 
by taking into account the potential of others’ 
responses.  Constructivist institutionalism cited 
in Rhodes et al. (2006: 56-57), intends to capture, 
describe, and interrogate complex changes and 
disequilibrium.  It focuses on post-formative 
changes, while historical institutionalism tends 
to analyze past changes.  It is stated further that 
constructivist institutionalism has the potential 
to overcome the weakness of rational choice 
institutionalism, since in the logic of rational 
choice, changes are always predictable, while 
constructivist argues that structural changes 
are mostly unpredictable, in the same way 
that coral reefs always grow differently due 
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to unpredictable environmental changes. This 
argument makes constructivist institutionalism 
the best theoretical perspective to study 
disasters and institutional crisis arrangements, 
since the nature of disasters is almost always 
unpredictable.  As such, structural changes 
(rules, institutions, and practices) will be 
the focus of the analysis of disasters and 
institutional crisis arrangements with regard to 
cases of recent disasters and crises in Indonesia.
3.  Research Method
A qualitative method was applied in this 
study, Jackson et al., (2007: 21) explain that 
“qualitative research is primarily concerned 
understanding human beings’ experiences 
in a humanistic, interpretive approach. Two 
techniques were used to gather the data in this 
research.  The first was by making a qualitative 
assessment and analysis of certain official 
documents, such as presidential decrees, laws 
and institutional reports (especially taken from 
BNPB, the Indonesian Red Cross, Ministry 
of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, Gugus 
Tugas Percepatan Penanganan COVID-19 
or Task Force for Acceleration of Covid-19 
Countermeasures/TFAC, etc). Information was 
also used taken from news and other documents 
such as government reports collected during 
the course of study. Second, in order to 
strengthen the document analysis, interviews 
were also applied to collect supporting data, 
especially with regards to the practice of 
disaster countermeasures by BNPB, the main 
government institution responsible for these. 
Discussion with experts and practitioners is 
also important, especially when analyzing data 
gathered from the field. The data analysis was 
conducted using content analysis. Jackson et 
al., (2007: 24) note that this is “a generic name 
for a variety of ways for conducting systematic, 
objective, quantitative, and/or qualitative 
textual analysis that involves comparing, 
contrasting, and categorizing a set of data 
primarily to test hypotheses”.
4.  Results and Discussion
4.1	 Institutional	 arrangements	 in	 the	 field	
of crisis and disaster in Indonesia
In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic 
in Indonesia, which was declared a national 
disaster by the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) in early March 2020, the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia signed Decree number 
7/2020 on the establishment of TFAC at the 
national level. This aimed to (1) improve the 
national health system and its performance; (2) 
accelerate Covid-19 countermeasures through 
inter-ministerial synergy, as well as synergy 
with provincial and local governments; (3) 
improve anticipation capacity to contain the 
spread of the pandemic; (4) improve operational 
decision-making synergy; and (5) improve 
preparedness and responses to Covid-19.
According to the decree, TFAC consists 
of two main sub-structures, the steering 
committee and the operational/managerial 
committee.  The operational/managerial 
committee has the duties to: (1) conduct 
daily operation of the Covid-19 operational 
plan; (2) coordinate and control Covid-19 
countermeasure activities; (3) supervise 
Covid-19 countermeasure activities; (4) deploy 
all resources to counter the pandemic outbreak; 
(5) and report to the president on all assigned 
duties. The operational/managerial structure 
consists of a chair (the Chair of the National 
Board for Disaster Countermeasures); vice 
chairs (Operational Assistant to the Indonesian 
Army Commander and Operational Assistant 
to the Indonesian Police Commander); and 
members (representatives of  the Coordinator 
Ministry of Human Development and Culture, 
Health Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry, 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Transportation 
Ministry, Communication and Information 
Ministry, Education and Culture Ministry, 
Religious Affairs Ministry, National Board for 
Disaster Countermeasures, Indonesian Army, 
Indonesian Police, and Presidential Office 
Staff).  Article 11 of the Decree stipulates that 
129 A Constructivist Institutionalism...(Ari Darmastuti)
ISSN: 0852-0682, EISSN: 2460-3945 Forum Geografi, Vol 34 (2) December 2020: 124-135
a similar task force is established in provincial 
and local levels.  
Regarding operation, the decree states that 
the TFAC may develop partnerships or involve 
other ministries and offices, as well as the 
private sector and other stakeholders, when 
necessary.  The TFAC is fully funded by the 
state budget.  At provincial and local levels, the 
respective TFACs are fully funded by provincial 
or local budgets.  The decree has also been 
used as the basis for diverting budget plans 
(at national, provincial, and local levels) from 
previous routine and development plans into a 
Covid-19 countermeasure budget without the 
common budget approval procedure through 
a long process of budget proposal submissions, 
discussions between executive and legislative 
bodies, and final acceptance or rejection of the 
budget.  The decree states that the president, 
governors, and regents/city mayors need to 
notify the legislative bodies at their respective 
levels about budget changes.  These bodies are 
not in a position to reject, or even to debate, 
the proposal, but are merely tasked to accept it 
unless there are serious suspicions of potential 
fraud. Budget diversion comes mostly from 
routine expenses such as staff travel, meetings 
and training, which have mostly been cancelled 
or postponed.  
Considering the magnitude of the 
Covid-19 outbreak threat, similar task forces 
were established at provincial and local levels 
that resemble the national structure, meaning 
they consist of related government offices, 
the military, the police and other provincial 
and local stakeholders.  Fast-track budget 
diversions have also been set up at provincial 
and local levels.  Areas with extensive 
Covid-19 outbreaks, such as Greater Specific 
Region Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central 
Java, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, 
may have larger budget diversions than other 
provinces with lower levels of cases. 
Lower level task forces at sub-district and 
village levels have been established in most of 
Indonesia since the Covid-19 outbreak, which 
was formally acknowledged by the GoI in early 
March as having infected 130,718 people, with a 
death toll of 5,903 as of 11 August 2020 (BNPB, 
2020).  Adaptations were made based on the 
varying conditions, which may not be the same 
in all places.  Areas with low or no Covid-19 
cases may need only minor structures and 
small budgets, but areas with a high number 
of cases would need extensive structures and 
budgets.
The Covid-19 pandemic disaster in 
Indonesia has been the only disaster which 
has needed the establishment of task forces all 
over Indonesia and at all levels of government 
structure.  There are some similarities in 
the institutional arrangements to guarantee 
working institutional procedures and 
operations.  However, there are also differences 
in the adaptation to various conditions and 
situations.  The institutional arrangements 
with regards to Covid-19 in Indonesia is 
a good example of how the proponents of 
constructivist institutionalism would argue. 
The following paragraphs will explain the 
different institutional arrangements for 
different types of disaster in Indonesia.
Following the tragedy of the tsunami in 
Aceh in 2004, which caused 165,708 deaths in 
Indonesia alone, with total deaths in the 12 
affected countries of more than 225,000, the 
House of Representatives and GoI initiated 
the establishment of a Law number 24/2007 
regarding Disaster Countermeasures, as the 
institutional foundation of such measures 
for all stakeholders (national to local).  The 
law stipulates that the Government of 
Indonesia develop comprehensive Disaster 
Countermeasure Management in an effort to 
dynamically implement management functions 
at all stages of disaster countermeasures, 
from prevention to mitigation, emergency, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction.  As 
mandated in the law, in 2008 the government 
established a new institution, currently known 
as BNPB, through Government Regulation 
number 8/2008 (BNPB, 2015a: 5-6), with main 
responsibilities regarding all stages of disaster 
countermeasures: (a) to develop guidelines 
and instructions  for all stakeholders; (b) to 
decide standards and needs; (c) to inform and 
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educate the public; (d) to report monthly to 
the president during normal periods and 
at any time during disaster periods; (e) to 
use and report on funds from national and 
international donors; (f) to report the use of 
the state budget; (g) to perform duties based 
on other regulations; and (h) to develop 
guidelines for the establishment of the 
Provincial Board for Disaster Countermeasures 
(Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/
BPBD Provinsi).  Based on these stipulations, 
the BNPB has established 34 BPBDs and 428 
BPBDs at regency/city levels.
Policies in the field of crisis and disaster 
management are integral parts of the National 
Development Plan System (Law number 
25/2004 regarding National Development 
Plant System).  Therefore, crisis and disaster 
management must be included in national, 
provincial, and regency/city long-term, mid-
term and annual planning.  An interview 
with an informant from the National Board 
on 11 January 2019 revealed that there were 
some important points from the arrangement 
of disaster countermeasures in Indonesia: 
(1) disaster on a mass scale will be managed 
nationally by the BNPB, with the remainder 
depending on the scale and type of disaster; 
(2)  crisis and disaster have become important 
issues in development planning in Indonesia; 
and (3) coordination between the many 
stakeholders remains difficult to implement, 
since disaster funds run through many tiers 
and branches of government agencies.    
Figure 2. Institutional arrangements for disaster countermeasures in Indonesia (Source: President Decree 
Number 7/2020)
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With these institutional arrangements, the 
differences between the rules and structures 
for the various disasters in Indonesia can be 
seen.  A mass level and long-term disaster 
such as Covid-19 is managed nationally by a 
specific task force coordinated by BNPB based 
on a Presidential Decree, which sets out certain 
standards pertaining to rules and structures, 
but also provides room for modifications 
depending on different situations and 
conditions (See figure 2).  The mega-magnitude 
2004 tsunami was also managed nationally 
by the BNPB, although not all provinces in 
Indonesia were affected.  Some disasters have 
been managed provincially when they have 
affected more than one regency/city, such 
as the tsunami in Palu/Donggala in Central 
Sulawesi Province in 2018 and the earthquake 
in Nusa Tenggara Barat, also in 2018.  The 2018 
South Lampung tsunami was managed by 
the local South Lampung BPBD, since it only 
affected that regency (Darmastuti and Rosalia, 
2019).  
4.2 Arrangements for the articulation of 
major risks from disasters
Based on its legal standing, the BNPB 
developed the Strategic Plan of 2015-2019.  In 
addition, it also developed the National Plan 
for Disaster Countermeasures of 2015-2019 
(BNPB, 2015b).    The differences between the 
two documents are that the first is focused 
on strategic issues such as the concept, 
legal basis and objectives, assessment of 
challenges, vision and mission statements, 
objectives, direction, and performance target 
of the BNPB, while the latter (National Plan 
for Disaster Countermeasures) is directed 
towards four national policy directions, 
namely implementation of: (1) integrated 
disaster risk reduction; (2) effective emergency 
management; (3) efficient rehabilitation and 
reconstruction; and (4) systems and mechanisms 
of accountability and transparency, as well as 
good governance of disaster countermeasures 
at national and local levels.
Based on National Plan 12, major disasters 
have been identified as posing major risks 
in most parts of Indonesia.  These include 
earthquakes, tsunami, volcanoes, landslides, 
flooding, flash-floods, drought, extreme 
weather, high tides and abrasion, forest 
and field fires, epidemics, and technological 
failures.  The National Plan also contains 
assessment of the area distributions of each of 
the 12 types of disaster all over Indonesia, the 
potential damage and casualties, and financial 
losses.  Based on this information, the National 
Plan developed a Disaster Risk Index (Indek 
Resiko Bencana/IRB) for each province and 
regency/city in Indonesia. The assessment is 
comprehensive and informative.  However, the 
data, as the basis of the assessment, does not 
cover a long period, meaning some areas that 
are clearly prone to certain types of disaster are 
not listed as tsunami disaster-prone areas (for 
instance, Lampung and Banten are not listed 
as areas prone to tsunami since the eruption 
of Krakatau Mountain in 1883 is not recorded 
in more recent data). Articulation of disaster 
issues is also dependent on the political will of 
each regime (provincial and regency/local), the 
commitment of leaders, and the consistency of 
human resource and financial support.   
In general, Indonesia’s institutional 
arrangements for disaster countermeasures are 
organized using a mix of vertical and horizontal 
approaches, in which units for the prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery of crises 
and disasters are arranged vertically, but 
based on the National Strategy of the BNPB 
as well as Law number 23/2014 juncto Law 
number 9/2015 regarding Local Government 
those institutions have to work together 
horizontally. At the national level, the most 
important institutions responding to crisis and 
disaster are the National Search and Rescue 
Agency, the BNPB and the Indonesian Red 
Cross.  Other responsible institutions include 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (provision of 
food and shelter and other immediate survival 
kits), the Ministry of Health (processing the 
identification of victims and health service 
provision); and the police and army (provision 
of safety and order).  A current issue regarding 
the institutional arrangements for disaster 
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countermeasures is the overlapping functions 
of the National Search and Rescue Agency with 
those of the BNPB.
Some institutions have functions for 
prevention and preparedness. These include 
(1) the Center for Volcanology and Mitigation 
of Geological Disasters; (2) the Board for 
Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics; 
and (3) the Board for Research and Application 
of Technology (in the case of tsunami early 
warning system development).    The functions 
of prevention and preparedness are also 
conducted at provincial and local levels, 
especially through branches of the respective 
national bodies.   However, some cases 
show that prevention and preparedness are 
sometimes affected by the inability to apply 
policies and regulations due to the nature of 
Indonesian geographical conditions, the lack of 
human resources, lack of funding, and problems 
of coordination. Institutions for rehabilitation 
and reconstruction include the National Land 
Entitlement Board (for entitlement identity 
reproduction); the Ministry of Public Work 
(provision of temporary and permanent 
housing for victims); and provincial and local 
government (provision of housing areas).  The 
speed of rehabilitation and reconstruction after 
disasters in Indonesia is critical due to aspects 
such as the availability of land and funds, 
complicated administrative procedures, and 
the complex social and cultural conditions of 
the affected communities.
4.3 Crisis and disaster countermeasures in 
Indonesia: lesson learned from natural 
disasters and other crises 
Other than the Covid-19 pandemic, 
recent disasters in Indonesia gave examples of 
whether the disaster institutional arrangements 
are working or not.   The earthquake and 
the following tsunami, together with the 
liquefaction in Palu and Donggala, Central 
Sulawesi on 28 September 2018 are an example 
of complex, difficult situations with critical 
conditions for countermeasures.  Among these 
were difficulties for rescuing victims due to the 
occurrence of a very rare disaster, liquefaction, 
in which a large part of the affected area is 
submerged and lost below the surface (BBC 
Indonesia, 2018). Coordination between 
stakeholders (international, national, provincial 
and local) was problematic, which led to a 
delayed response and dissatisfaction both 
among the organizational stakeholders and the 
victims of the disaster.  This resulted in days of 
mass lootings and disorder among community 
members and was largely criticized; only then 
was order restored and the response able to start 
to work. The severity of the disaster destroyed 
almost all the infrastructure, including 
communication, which made coordination, as 
well as efforts to combat fake news, difficult. 
It almost crippled the government. These 
multiple factors created a poor lesson in natural 
disaster countermeasures.
The more recent 22 December 2018 tsunami 
that hit Lampung and Banten Provinces was an 
example of a quite good disaster management 
response.  Although the tsunami was a new 
phenomenon (with no recorded history of a 
huge landslide from the top of the mountain-
only island of Krakatau to the bottom of the 
surrounding sea), the response to the disaster 
was quick and well managed.  Observations 
on the third day after the tsunami showed 
almost all the victims had been rescued; the 
large number of of rescue squads, volunteers, 
aid workers and donations were well directed, 
which made emergency aid accessible by the 
victims. Health services were made available 
on the second day, together with other supplies 
for the victims, which prevented a worsening of 
their conditions. This quite successful disaster 
management was made possible by several 
critical aspects: (1) government up to the 
village level was still functional; (2) destruction 
to infrastructure, including communication, 
was minimal, so efficient communication was 
possible; and (3) the two locations were very 
close to central government, which allowed aid 
to reach the area and the victims more quickly.
These two disasters, as well as the 
Covid-19 pandemic, provide examples of how 
government institutions, which have the main 
responsibilities in disaster countermeasures 
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and are based on the same regulations (law on 
the lower level regulations), in reality develop 
rules and structures which may differ from one 
other.  The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered 
the establishment of nationwide long-term task 
forces at national, provincial, and local levels. 
In some areas, this task force extends to sub-
district and even village and neighborhood 
levels.  Areas with red-zone status (high 
outbreak risk) have developed much stronger 
institutions and provided higher budget 
diversion than yellow (low outbreak risk) 
and green (no local transmission) status 
areas.  Each level task force may also work 
together with different disaster stakeholders, 
who may come from the private sector, non-
government organizations, community- based 
organizations, or professional groups.  The 
Presidential, Governor, and Regent/Mayor 
Decrees have been the main legal basis for 
regulation and institutional establishment; 
however, they all provide scope for institutional 
adaptation to exogenous factors, especially the 
threat of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Other disasters may need a national task 
force, but which is only functional in some 
provinces depending on the potential level of 
disaster, or the province, or even only local level 
task force.  Most disasters in Indonesia are local 
in nature, such as flash floods, fires, forest fires, 
landslides, and drought.  Earthquakes may 
need provincial or national task force when 
combined with tsunami.  This implies that not 
only will the structures be different, but also 
the use of budgets, mobilization of manpower, 
and the use of other resources will vary.  The 
choice of these arrangements is, by and large, 
unpredictable in nature, as the constructivist 
institutionalism theory suggest that most of the 
time institutions are faced with unpredictable 
exogenous factors. Using other theory to 
analyze institutional arrangements for disaster 
countermeasures, especially rational choice, 
would be difficult and may be unfruitful.
It is important to note that studies related 
to the current Covid-19 pandemic in other 
countries show that other countries have also 
established structural institutions, responses 
and management for Covid-19 which are 
different from institutions for other crises and 
disasters.  The studies conducted by Cesarec et 
al. (2020), Mikac (2020) and Smajić (2020) have 
revealed that the Republic of Croatia, Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European 
Union (EU) have been forced to quickly adjust 
their institutional structures to respond to 
the unprecedented threat of the pandemic. 
These countries and the EU had not fully 
anticipated the preparedness phase of Covid-19 
countermeasures.  However, in the response 
phase of these, all made quick adjustments to 
policies, structuring and facilitating responses, 
as well as coordinating with other institutions at 
national, regional and global levels.  However, 
the question still remains as to whether they 
will able to cope with the magnitude of the 
remaining problems (health, economic and 
social) in the recovery phase.   
This response and recovery phase will 
critically dependent on certain factors, some 
of which may be external, especially in the 
current Covid-19 pandemic.  First, responses 
to large-scale disasters are influenced by 
cooperation and help from the international 
community.  The pandemic definitely shows 
this need, such as the success of lockdown 
and containment of people’s cross-border 
movements.  Second, the availability of certain 
critical supplies and medicines is also highly 
dependent on international cooperation and 
help.  Covid-19 vaccines are a clear example of 
such a need.  Third, the availability of experts 
can also be dependent on external sources. 
We have learned that in countering disasters, 
nations, no matter how advanced they are, 
still need regional and international help and 
cooperation.  This exogenous factor is similarly 
critical to the internal preparedness of a nation 
in constructing institutional arrangements for 
disaster countermeasures.     
5. Conclusion
Indonesia has experienced disasters on 
many scales and magnitudes, from small 
insignificant ones, up to extremely disastrous 
ones.   Systematic study regarding institutional 
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arrangements for disaster countermeasures 
based on new theoretical perspectives needs to 
be conducted to enable analysis of phenomena 
which may contribute new insights.  This 
constructivist perspective study is expected 
to contribute new insights which supplement 
the most commonly used theories of rational 
choice and network new institutionalism.  
Although the institutional arrangements 
for disaster countermeasures in Indonesia are 
based on the same law, the implementation 
of institutional structuring as well practices 
in disaster counter measurements vary 
greatly.  Moreover, it is important to establish 
taskforces at all levels that are given mandates 
to establish necessary structures and to divert 
budgets from regular conventional processes 
to fast-track more flexible ones.   
Other disasters than the current Covid-19 
pandemic are mostly managed through 
smaller institutional arrangements, whether 
nationally, provincially or locally.  National 
disasters are usually managed directly by 
BNPB, while those at provincial and local levels 
are managed by the respective institutions. 
This implies flexibility in arranging budgets 
for disaster countermeasures; budget 
diversion is not easily done, even by 
government institutions, when implementing 
disaster countermeasures.   Finally, this 
study demonstrates that the choice of the 
constructivist theoretical perspective provides 
richer understanding of how institutions 
work in countering disasters, by adjusting to 
exogenous unpredictable factors.
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